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Abstract
Coronavirus has claimed the lives of over half a million people world-wide and this death 
toll continues to rise rapidly each day. In the absence of a vaccine, non-clinical preventative 
measures have been implemented as the principal means of limiting deaths. However, these 
measures have caused unprecedented disruption to daily lives and economic activity. Given 
this developing crisis, the potential for a second wave of infections and the near certainty of 
future pandemics, lessons need to be rapidly gleaned from the available data. We address 
the challenges of cross-country comparisons by allowing for differences in reporting and 
variation in underlying socio-economic conditions between countries. Our analyses show 
that, to date, differences in policy interventions have out-weighed socio-economic variation 
in explaining the range of death rates observed in the data. Our epidemiological models 
show that across 8 countries a further week long delay in imposing lockdown would likely 
have cost more than half a million lives. Furthermore, those countries which acted more 
promptly saved substantially more lives than those that delayed. Linking decisions over 
the timing of lockdown and consequent deaths to economic data, we reveal the costs that 
national governments were implicitly prepared to pay to protect their citizens as reflected in 
the economic activity foregone to save lives. These ‘price of life’ estimates vary enormously 
between countries, ranging from as low as around $100,000 (e.g. the UK, US and Italy) to 
in excess of $1million (e.g. Denmark, Germany, New Zealand and Korea). The lowest esti-
mates are further reduced once we correct for under-reporting of Covid-19 deaths.
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1 Introduction
SARS-CoV-2, the virus which causes the Covid-19 disease, is a zoonotic pathogen which 
emerged in Wuhan in late 2019 (Huang et al. 2020). At the time of writing, in early July 
2020, it had already claimed the lives of over half a million people globally (Beltekian 
et al. 2020). In the USA Covid-19 deaths now exceed the number of US military deaths 
arising from all conflict since the Second World War (Statista 2020) while in the UK the 
four weeks to 24th April saw more Londoners lose their lives to Covid-19 than during the 
deadliest four week period of the Blitz (Morris and Barnes 2020).
This death toll is only the extremely saddening tip of the much larger iceberg of disrup-
tion that Covid-19 has caused and continues to cause. Confirmed cases across the world 
now exceed eleven million (Beltekian et al. 2020) and the true infection rate is likely far 
higher. Each case imposes a real cost on every infected individual. While symptoms may 
sound innocuous, including a dry cough, fever, and tiredness (WHO 2020a; Verity et al. 
2020), longer term this morbidity is likely to impose significant costs on sufferers’ health, 
including potentially permanent lung damage or fibrosis associated with impacts upon the 
heart, kidneys and brain (Citroner 2020), all of which are likely to have negative conse-
quences for future well-being and productivity.
Moreover, alongside the vast disruption that the virus itself has caused directly, pre-
ventative measures have caused further disarray in the economy. At present, there are no 
known specific treatments or available vaccines to either cure or prevent Covid-19 infec-
tions (WHO 2020b). Therefore governments world-wide have relied upon preventative 
measures which aim to reduce the number of people exposed to the virus, and lower the 
effective reproductive number (the average number of new cases per infection, known as 
R), ideally suppressing it below a value of 1 at which point the number of active cases 
decreases over time (Ferguson et  al. 2020). While some of these measures impose rela-
tively little personal or economic cost (such as simple hand hygiene and the use of face 
masks), the failure of such measures to stem the rapid world-wide spread of the virus has 
necessitated international “stay at home” lockdown requirements, entailing significant 
impacts across the global economy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts a 
contraction in global GDP of three percent in 2020—a decline of 6.4% relative to its Octo-
ber 2019 forecast—and a decrease which it describes as being “much worse than during 
the 2008–2009 financial crisis” (IMF 2020a). Short term effects are even more extreme. 
For example, in the UK, GDP fell by 20.4% in April 2020 (ONS 2020a), while those 
claiming unemployment benefits rose nearly 70% to over 2 million (ONS 2020b), although 
even this is dwarfed by the 200% increase in US unemployment over the same period 
(Aratani 2020).1 Globally sovereign debt is also soaring: predicted to grow nearly 20% to 
$53 trillion in 2020 (Standard and Poor 2020) as administrations around the world race 
to protect cash-strapped companies from going out of business in order to prevent further 
unemployment.
At the human level, lives and livelihoods have been turned upside-down. Hence 
the true economic costs are more diverse and quite possibly more severe than that cap-
tured by financial metrics alone. They include negative ramifications for people’s mental 
health (Pancani et al. 2020; Chaix et al. 2020; Branley-Bell and Talbot 2020); increased 
1 Kurmann et  al. (2020) note that small business employment contracted by 60% (over 18.2 million) 
between mid-February and mid-April 2020 since when over 9 million had been rehired to the end of June 
2020.
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prevalence of domestic violence (McLay 2020); and likely reduce the educational achieve-
ment of today’s children (Pinto and Jones 2020; Van Lancker and Parolin 2020). As with 
previous financial crises (Hoynes et al. 2012) and pandemics (Nikolopoulos et al. 2011), 
the virus and the economic fall-out are disproportionately affecting people from disadvan-
taged groups and lower-income households. Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic people are 
more likely to be infected and die (Bhala et al. 2020; Garg 2020; Khunti et al. 2020; Yancy 
2020; Public Health England 2020); and lower-income households are less likely to be able 
to work from home, so face greater negative income shocks (Hanspal et al. 2020; Hensvik 
et al. 2020), just as poorer countries are likely to suffer more than richer nations (Hevia and 
Neumeyer 2020).
As is well known, different countries have had very different death tolls. The USA cur-
rently has the highest death toll in the world, already exceeding 130,000 deaths (as of 4th 
July 2020).2 In contrast, Vietnam—which recorded its first case just 4 days after the USA—
is yet to experience a single death. Understanding what drives these differences is clearly 
crucial, potentially enabling improved responses to the continuing Covid-19 outbreak and 
future pandemics. This paper begins to answer the critical question of why different coun-
tries have suffered different death rates, and what we can learn for future policy.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. In Sect. 2 we first compare the numbers 
of deaths attributed to Covid-19 across all OECD countries. The paper briefly focusses 
upon the UK as an example of a broader pattern; that public reporting of numbers related 
to the pandemic can be somewhat misleading. Next, we control for any within-country 
under-reporting by analysing the overall increase in all deaths above what would be sea-
sonally expected. Assessing these ‘excess deaths’ data suggests that in most nations for 
which information is available official reporting of Covid-19 tends to explain most of this 
unexpected mortality. However, analysis also reveals some clear exceptions, such as in the 
Netherlands, Spain and the UK where more than 40% of all Covid-19 deaths seem likely to 
have not been counted as such. Addressing such reporting problems is an essential element 
of providing the informational base required for an evidence-based policy response to this 
and any future pandemics.
In Sect.  3 we assess the impact of government decisions regarding lockdown, their 
effectiveness and the policy trade-off between economic activity and health risk that they 
reveal. Accepting that they are a conservative estimate of the total impact of the pandemic, 
officially attributed Covid-19 deaths are used to investigate the price of life implied by 
lockdown policies. First we use a simple regression analysis to show that differences in 
mortality rates between countries are not driven by factors which are beyond the short 
term control of policy makers—such as differences in income and equality which, at least 
within the time available to fight coronavirus are effectively fixed. This in turn allows us 
to examine the degree of control which policymakers do have at their disposal, such as the 
rapidity of lockdown imposition and the duration of such controls. We use country-specific 
Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered (SEIR) models, similar to the approach of Fergu-
son et al. (2020), to ask how changes in the timing of lockdown measures affect the current 
death toll. Our analyses provide good evidence that these policy tools actually determine 
the majority of variation in Covid-19 impacts between countries. Finally, we link these 
estimates to financial data to reveal a huge variation in the implied price of life across 
countries. Section 4 concludes.
2 Source: Worldometer, https ://www.world omete rs.info/coron aviru s/count ry/us/ accessed 4th July 2020.
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2  The Current Global Situation: Reconciling Different Measures
2.1  Cross‑Country Differences
Table 1 presents the number of tests, cases and deaths that are officially recorded as (at 
least in part) caused by Covid-19 across all OECD countries as of 9th June 2020 (data from 
Our World in Data; Beltekian et al. 2020). As mentioned, and considered in greater detail 
subsequently, these official estimates are likely to under-estimate deaths from Covid-19. 
However, the degree of under-reporting is far from constant across countries. For example, 
while almost all countries only counted deaths which had been confirmed to be linked to 
Covid-19, Belgium adopts a much broader approach also including deaths where Covid-
19 is merely suspected as a contributory factor (Chini 2020). This results in much higher 
death rates than in other countries. Arguably adopting the Belgian approach internationally 
might provide a more accurate picture of Covid-19 mortality.
It is worth drawing attention to the very substantial variation in tests, recorded Covid-19 
case numbers and official death tolls across countries. Adjusting for population, Iceland 
has undertaken far more testing per capita than any other OECD country, at over 183 K/
million compared to just 2 K/million in Mexico.
Much media attention has been expended upon reporting cumulative Covid-19 numbers 
in each country. In terms of cases the roughly 2 million cases reported in the USA is indeed 
a prominent result. However, unsurprisingly it is the total numbers of deaths by country 
which has attracted more attention and again the US total of well over 100,000 deaths is 
eye-catching. However, this media and policy-maker focus upon totals disguises the true 
comparison of these figures in failing to make even the most basic of adjustments for varia-
tion in population size between countries. Once this is done then the death rate per million 
shown in the final column of Table 1 reveals a substantially different story. Here we need 
to rule Belgium out of comparison because its addition of suspected Covid-19 deaths to the 
confirmed deaths reported by other countries, upwardly inflates its death rate. Given this, 
the death rate reported in the UK is the highest amongst all of the OECD, exceeding even 
those of Spain and Italy which experienced their first major outbreaks much earlier on in 
the pandemic.
It is worth highlighting how reporting elsewhere can be somewhat misleading. We do 
so by focussing on the UK as this is the country we are most familiar with, but the story 
is highly likely to be similar elsewhere. Figure 1 graphs the development of total recorded 
deaths (vertical axis) for a selection of 10 countries over roughly the first 100 days since 
each country recorded its 50th death (horizontal axis). This graph and its selection of coun-
tries is dictated by that which the UK government chose to highlight for comparison at its 
daily coronavirus press briefings.3
Setting aside for the moment the US trend, clear separation can be observed between 
those countries such as Germany and Korea, which rapidly entered into lockdown and 
quickly controlled the growth of the virus, and those countries such as the UK and Spain, 
3 The figure is a redrawing of one which was displayed daily at the UK press briefing from 30th March 
2020 until being left out of daily briefings from 10th May 2020 onwards. Speeches by the Prime Minis-
ter on Covid-19 had been conducted before then (for example on the 9th and 12th March) but they only 
became a daily occurrence with a relatively standardised format from 16th March onwards. Slides from 
these briefings are available here: https ://www.gov.uk/gover nment /colle ction s/slide s-and-datas ets-to-accom 
pany-coron aviru s-press -confe rence s.
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Table 1  Covid-19 data for OECD countries
Data from Our World in Data, correct as of 9th June 2020. Tests are to the nearest thousand, measurement 
unit varies by country. Tests per million to the nearest tens of tests. Total cases to the nearest ten cases, 


















Australia 1579 61,930 7270 285 102 4
Austria 490 54,360 16,890 1875 672 75
Belgium 741 63,980 59,350 5121 9609 829
Canada 1868 49,500 96,230 2550 7835 207
Chile 688 35,960 138,850 7263 2264 118
Colombia 400 7850 40,720 800 1308 26
Czech Rep. 472 44,030 9700 906 328 31
Denmark 572 98,720 11,960 2065 593 102
Estonia 90 67,900 1940 1462 69 52
Finland 201 36,290 7000 1264 323 58
France NA NA 154,190 2362 29,209 447
Germany 4349 51,910 184,540 2203 8711 104
Greece 194 18,610 3050 293 182 17
Hungary 207 21,410 4010 416 548 57
Iceland 63 183,820 1810 5295 10 29
Ireland 348 70,560 25,210 5105 1683 341
Israel 565 65,290 18,090 2090 298 34
Italy 4187 69,250 235,280 3891 33,964 562
Japan 314 2490 17,210 136 916 7
Korea 1013 19,750 11,850 231 274 5
Latvia 118 62,380 1090 577 26 14
Lithuania 326 119,860 1720 632 71 26
Luxembourg 85 135,680 4040 6454 110 176
Mexico 284 2200 120,100 932 14,053 109
Netherlands 392 22,850 47,740 2786 6016 351
New Zealand 294 60,980 1150 239 22 5
Norway 257 47,460 8550 1577 239 44
Poland 967 25,560 27,160 718 1166 31
Portugal 874 85,710 34,890 3421 1485 146
Slovakia 188 34,480 1530 280 28 5
Slovenia 83 39,860 1490 714 108 52
Spain 2536 54,250 241,720 5170 27,136 580
Sweden 276 27,280 45,130 4469 4694 465
Switzerland 423 48,930 30,890 3569 1660 192
Turkey 2303 27,310 171,120 2029 4711 56
UK 3250 47,880 287,400 4234 40,597 598
USA 20,385 61,590 1,961,190 5925 111,007 335
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where lockdown was delayed resulting in a higher plateau. This is the first indication of the 
positive effects of early lockdown action, which we consider further subsequently.
The UK government’s decision to only display the total number of deaths in each of the 
countries shown took no account of even basic differences between countries such as popu-
lation size; and as Table 1 has already shown, this makes fair comparison of death rates 
difficult. It might seem unusual to fail to make such basic adjustments, however the choice 
of such a display by the government is one which shows the UK cumulative total initially 
below that of European neighbours such as Italy and Spain and consistently dwarfed by 
that for the US, rising to more than twice the UK level. The fact that the US population is 
more than five times that of the UK, and that therefore per capita rates were much higher in 
the UK, is not obvious in this display.
During the early days of the coronavirus outbreak, this omission of per capita data and 
focus upon cumulative totals allowed the UK government to make cross country compari-
sons which indicated that the country appeared to be faring better than many international 
counterparts (such sentiments are clear in transcripts of the verbal explanation which 
accompanied the graph, presented in Online Appendix 1). For example, on the 1st April, 
the graph was described by the UK government as showing “it has not been as severe here 
as in France, and we are just tucked in under the USA and obviously Italy on a differ-
ent trajectory”. However, as the pandemic developed so the performance of the UK rela-
tive to these other countries worsened. This situation was exacerbated by an outcry against 
the UK government’s use of statistics based only upon deaths within hospitals rather than 
also including those in the community, ignoring obvious discrepancies such as a clear rise 
in deaths within care homes into which elderly hospital patients had been moved without 
testing for coronavirus (Discombe 2020; Grey and MacAskill 2020). Shifting to report-
ing deaths from all settings revealed that the UK was faring far worse than nearly all other 
Fig. 1  Cumulative deaths (vertical axis) plotted for various countries (as selected for comparison in UK 
Government briefings) over approximately the first 100 days since each country recorded its fiftieth death 
(horizontal axis). Note that Spain’s apparent decrease in cumulative deaths around day 70 is an artefact of 
their reporting problems
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countries and indeed in per capita terms was experiencing one of the highest death rates 
globally (Beltekian et al. 2020).
The impact upon the official narrative presented at UK press briefings was swift and 
noticeable. While initially much emphasis had been placed upon the UK’s apparently 
favourable performance compared to other nations, now Government officials started to 
mention the difficulty of making cross country comparisons, as highlighted by the pink dots 
at the top of Fig. 1 (and data presented in Online Appendix 2).4 These caveats increased in 
both regularity and stridency until, on 10th May 2020, cross country comparisons were 
removed from Government press conferences. We have no reason to suspect that the UK 
government was unique in attempting to provide a positive representation of trends. How-
ever, a failure to provide clear and objective information is a well acknowledged cause of 
mistrust in authority (Kavanagh and Rich 2018) and is corrosive to public life at any time, 
but particularly in a pandemic where trust in institutions is vital.
2.2  Challenges to Making Cross‑Country Comparisons
In undertaking cross-country comparisons of the impacts of Covid-19 a first issue to be 
tackled is the difference in national approaches to reporting. This can be seen even in the 
reporting of testing statistics, differences which some authorities have argued may be polit-
ically motivated (Norgrove 2020). Likewise, some countries (e.g. Belgium) are far more 
likely than others to ascribe a death as caused by Covid-19 (Chini 2020).
Given these concerns, we complement our comparisons of official Covid-19 statistics 
with analysis of patterns in excess mortality data. Here we define excess mortality for a 
country as the deviation in mortality rate during the period January to April 2020 com-
pared to a baseline of expected deaths from previous years. Excess mortality data is there-
fore not biased by differential rates of Covid-19 testing or legislation on ascribing cause of 
death.
There are however important caveats to the excess mortality figures. Such numbers do 
not exclusively capture the increase in mortality that is directly caused by the presence of 
the novel virus. In addition, people may be less likely to visit hospital and therefore less 
likely to get treated for what are, in normal times curable diseases, thus tragically dying 
at a higher rate (Thornton 2020). Similarly, first response services may get overwhelmed 
and therefore be less able to respond to life threatening emergencies such as heart attacks 
and strokes, again causing higher than expected death rates (Oke and Heneghan 2020). 
Acting in the opposite direction, government responses to coronavirus such as lockdown, 
may reduce the number of deaths from other causes; transmission rates for other communi-
cable diseases are likely to be suppressed while a reduction in travel reduces the mortality 
associated with traffic accidents (Alé-Chilet et al. 2020). It is therefore not a priori obvi-
ous whether excess mortality is positive or negative. Nonetheless, comparison of excess 
mortality with official Covid-19 deaths will provide a more informed picture of the overall 
impacts of the pandemic within and across countries.
4 The verbal explanation which accompanied the presentation of Fig. 1 each day is gained by re-watching 
the recordings hosted by the government’s official YouTube channel: https ://www.youtu be.com/user/Numbe 
r10go v/video s. As discussed in text, transcripts of the relevant section are provided in Online Appendix 1. 
AntConc software (Anthony 2019) was used to search for particular phrases. These phrases, and the daily 
counts for each, are given in Online Appendix 2.
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Table 2 presents excess mortality data for the subset of OECD countries for which it 
is available. In general, the data are from The Economist (2020) but are supplemented for 
some countries by data from other sources.5 Baseline mortality is typically calculated as 
the mean number of deaths occurring in January-April 2015–2019.6 Excess deaths are cal-
culated as the difference between the number of deaths observed in January-April 2020 and 
baseline mortality. The final column is the ratio of excess death to cumulative deaths at the 
end of April for each country, as reported by Our World in Data (Beltekian et al. 2020), 
calculated as:
The heterogeneity that was present in the statistics of officially recorded Covid-19 deaths 
is also present in the excess mortality data. Some countries, such as Austria, Iceland and 
Portugal see only very marginal increases in death rates as compared with background 
death. There are countries which appear to do even better; Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Israel and Norway all observing fewer deaths than expected. As discussed above, these 
negative excess death numbers could be the result of measures to combat Covid-19 reduc-
ing other-cause mortality, or from previous years used to calculate the baseline number of 
deaths being particularly bad. Indeed 2020 does seem to have been a year with relatively 
few deaths from influenza (Center for Disease Control 2020). At the other extreme, coun-
tries which appear worst hit based upon the officially recorded per capita death data are 
also those experiencing the highest percentage increase in mortality: Belgium, Spain and 
the UK all record deaths that are more than 15% higher than expected. Note that Italy too 
may well have been in this list, but the data for Italy is only available to 30th March, about 
the time the country experiences its peak daily mortality.
Turning to the ratio of excess deaths to officially reported deaths, again there appears 
considerable heterogeneity across countries, suggesting countries are indeed measuring the 
death toll from the pandemic by very different yard sticks. Generally, countries officially 
reporting high deaths tolls are also those which have the highest ratio of excess deaths 
to officially reported deaths. Indeed, Austria, Iceland and Portugal report more Covid-19 
deaths than the excess deaths they experience. It is worth noting this is not to say that these 
(1)Ratio = Excess deaths∕Officially reported deaths
5 The other data sources used for particular countries are: Austria - http://www.stati stik.at/web_de/stati 
stike n/mensc hen_und_gesel lscha ft/bevoe lkeru ng/gesto rbene /index .html); Belgium—https ://epist at.wiv-
isp.be/momo/; Finland - https ://pxnet 2.stat.fi/PXWeb /pxweb /en/Kokee llise t_tilas tot/Kokee llise t_tilas 
tot__vamuu _koke/statfi n_vamuu _pxt_12ng.px/; Iceland—https ://hagst ofa.is/utgaf ur/tilra unato lfrae di/danir 
-tt/; Ireland (note these are death registrations rather than government figures)—https ://rip.ie/Death notic 
es/All; Israel—https ://www.healt h.gov.il/Units Offic e/HD/PH/epide miolo gy/Pages /epide miolo gy_repor 
t.aspx?WPID=WPQ7&PN=6; New Zealand—https ://www.newsr oom.co.nz/2020/05/05/1,157,173/are-
there -hidde n-covid -19-death s-in-nzs-stati stics ; Spain (importantly accessed on 11th June, after there was 
a major addition to the figures)—https ://www.scb.se/conte ntass ets/edc2b 33f85 ad415 d8e79 09002 253ed 
84/2020-04-09%E2%80%94pre limin ar-stati stik-over-doda-inkl-eng.xlsx; USA—https ://data.cdc.gov/
NCHS/Exces s-Death s-Assoc iated -with-COVID -19/xkkf-xrst. Even among the countries for which data is 
available, mortality data are only available for a few months of the year, generally at least to the end of 
April, hence the focus January–April 2020 deaths. Data tend to be aggregated to the week level, hence the 
exact endpoint is rarely 30th April 2020. Rather, the last day used in 2020 is determined by the data avail-
ability, and chosen to be as close as possible to 30th April. In all cases, we compare like-for-like, such that 
the baseline deaths are recorded over the same time period. Likewise, the cumulative death toll we use to 
calculate the ratio of excess to reported death is that which was officially reported on the last day of the 
2020 mortality data we use for each country.
6 For some countries data availability means this is not possible. For Austria, Belgium and Germany it is 
2016–2019; Iceland and USA use 2017–2019; for Spain baseline deaths are modelled by MoMo.
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countries are recording deaths as Covid-19 when they are not; rather it is entirely plausible 
the interventions to prevent Covid-19 in these countries have suppressed other deaths too. 
At the other extreme, some countries, notably the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, have 
ratios which imply upwards of 40% of Covid-19 deaths that are occurring are not being 
officially recorded. There are of course outliers to the overall pattern. Belgium, France and 
Sweden, have ratios below 1 despite having high per capita death tolls. Likewise, Chile and 
New Zealand have very high ratios, but these are almost certainly an artefact of them hav-
ing so few Covid-19 deaths by the end of April, rather than because of under-reporting in 
each nation.
To recap, there are vast differences in the number of cases and deaths caused by corona-
virus in different countries. This heterogeneity does not merely disappear when we account 
for potentially different reporting guidelines in each country; rather it may even be exac-
erbated. So what could be driving these patterns? While most countries chose to imple-
ment a relatively similar policy response, they did so at different times in their respective 
pandemics and some have been criticised for only belatedly imposing lockdown.7 There is 
some early correlative evidence that differences in current death tolls could be explained 
by lockdown date (Burn-Murdoch and Giles 2020) and we now move to consider this issue 
in greater detail.
3  Policy Decisions and the Implied Price of Life
Our investigations of the potential impact of different approaches to reporting show the 
usefulness of an internationally agreed standard for assessing the impact of the pandemic. 
However, in the absence of such a standard we use national official estimates of Covid-
19 mortality to understand the impact of lockdown policies. Data is supplied by the Our 
World in Data programme (Beltekian et al. 2020).
An initial task was to estimate the overall impact which policy responses could plau-
sibly have had on Covid-19 mortality. To achieve this we undertook regression analysis 
examining the extent to which variation in Covid-19 deaths across all 37 OECD countries 
might be explained by socio-economic and demographic differences which no government 
could reasonably be expected to address during the timescale of a pandemic. A number 
of such exogenous determinants have already been highlighted in the literature. Of these 
one of the most clearly established mortality risk factors is a positive association with age; 
all other things considered, older sufferers are more likely to die from contracting Covid-
19 than are younger people (Dowd et al. 2020). Therefore, across countries, populations 
which include a greater proportion of elderly people are likely to report higher death tolls. 
Similarly, those living in closer proximity to others may be more likely to pass on and 
contract the respiratory disease, hence variation in population density across nations may 
be a determinant of Covid-19 deaths (Rocklöv and Sjödin 2020). Beyond simple average 
population density, the degree to which populations are clustered in large urban centres 
may influence Covid-19-related mortality (Stier et al. 2020). Health outcomes might also 
differ because of within-country variation in wealth (Marmot 2005) which we capture in 
our regression by controlling for the Gini coefficient of income inequality for each country. 
Richer nations are likely better placed to limit the spread of pandemics (e.g. Hosseini et al. 
7 For example, the UK has been criticised for delaying lockdown (Scally et al. 2020).
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2020), hence we use per capita GDP as a regressor to net-out cross-country differences 
owing to wealth. Finally, previous studies (e.g. Fraser et  al. 2004) have highlighted that 
early detection may play a crucial role in halting virus spread, hence it seems plausible that 
countries which were exposed to Covid-19 earlier in the pandemic, and that therefore had 
less time to prepare, faced worse consequences. To account for this, we use the regressor 
“warning days”—the length of time (in days) between the WHO declaring that the Covid-
19 outbreak was a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” on 30th January 
2020 and the country recording its 100th confirmed case (WHO 2020c).
The linear regression we use, details of which are presented alongside full results in 
Online Appendix 3, is deliberately simple and we are not claiming that the model neces-
sarily captures causal relationships. However, even after including the list of exogenous 
factors which have been hypothesised to be major socio-economic and demographic driv-
ers of cross-country variation in mortality rates, over 75% of the cross-country variation in 
Covid-19 mortality differences remains unexplained. Covid-19 deaths vary greatly across 
countries due to factors beyond socio-economics and demographics; the major remaining 
determinant is the policy responses implemented by national governments of which the 
most obvious difference is when different countries implemented lockdown.8
To investigate the impact of lockdown upon cross-country variation in Covid-19 mor-
tality we calibrate country-specific SEIR  models. SEIR models have a long history of 
development (Li and Muldowney 1995) with applications across a variety of infectious 
diseases including measles (Bolker 1993), HIV (Shaikhet and Korobeinikov 2016) and 
Ebola (Lekone and Finkenstadt 2006). More recently SEIR models have also been applied 
to Covid-19 (e.g. Annan 2020; Flaxman et al. 2020; Pei et al. 2020). However, as far as 
we are aware, ours is the first study to use the SEIR modelling framework to examine the 
effects of lockdown timing across multiple countries in the same study, and the first to 
combine these results with financial forecasts to obtain cross-country implied price of life 
estimates.
Price of life estimates derived in this paper are of critical importance given that govern-
ment intervention has the ability to save life, yet trades-off against other goods. For exam-
ple, closing schools is expected to reduce the transmission of infectious disease, hence 
decreasing the number of lives lost in a pandemic by imposing a human capital cost on 
today’s children (Viner et  al. 2020). Likewise, there is evidence that the more stringent 
the government intervention to reduce the spread of coronavirus, the fewer lives that have 
been lost (Stojkoski et al. 2020). This too is not free: we all pay with restrictions on our 
basic freedoms. Beyond coronavirus, governments spend money and introduce legisla-
tion which imposes significant costs on society in a variety of sectors: healthcare (NICE 
2012), road safety (DfT 2016), and safety at work legislation (HSE 2016). Governments 
also often have to consider multiple policy options for issues of environmental concern, be 
that considering pollution (Ackerman and Heinzerling 2002), climate change (Stern 2007) 
or biodiversity loss (Ellis et  al. 2015). Here too, lives can be saved and lost as a conse-
quences of policy decisions. Hence understanding how governments should value life is of 
critical concern. Indeed, a significant section of relevant policy documents is occupied by 
8 Indeed, as is reported in Balmford et  al. (2020) a similar regression, dropping all covariates and only 
including the delay to enacting lockdown explains nearly 40% of total variation. The effect is robust to 
including the covariates we specify here but overall  r2 is only marginally increased, and the adjusted  r2 is 
actually lower than with the lockdown delay alone.
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discussion of the value which a government should place on statistical life when evaluating 
policy (e.g. The Green Book; H.M. Treasury 2018).
In the case of coronavirus, there are already studies which aim to assess the economic 
value of particular policy interventions by reducing the number of lives lost. Hale et  al. 
(2020) ask: how much of one year’s consumption would an individual be willing to forgo 
in order to reduce the mortality associated with Covid-19, suggesting the answer lies in 
the range one-quarter to one-half depending on exact mortality rates. Underpinned by 
assumptions about the rate of transmission and how policies may affect this, Greenstone 
and Nigam (2020) show the economic benefit of social distancing measures in the USA to 
be very substantial—about $8 trillion. Similarly, Thunström et al. (2020) use initial global 
estimates for the basic reproductive rate, and assume decreases to transmission from policy 
intervention from studies on Spanish flu, to go further. They conduct a cost–benefit analy-
sis for similar measures, again in the USA, showing that the net benefits exceed $5.2 tril-
lion. Gandjour (2020) and Holden and Preston (2020) conduct similar cost–benefit style 
analyses for Germany and Australia, respectively, both highlighting that lockdown comes 
out net positive. Here we ask a different but related question. Not whether lockdown makes 
economic sense, but rather what the timing of interventions reveal about the relative prices 
different governments place on their citizens’ lives. We focus on 9 countries with very dif-
ferent mortality rates and intervention timing—if there are discrepancies between countries 
for the price of life, they are most likely to be shown in this set of countries. In China, lock-
downs were implemented on a province-by-province basis on very different dates. There-
fore, at the country-level our GDP calculations would be incomparable with other nations. 
To overcome this challenge, we additionally parameterise an epidemiological model for 
Hubei, the province worst hit by the pandemic. We use the results from Hubei in our price 
of life calculations to maintain comparability across countries.
To be clear, the implied price of life should not be regarded as comparable to the Value 
of a Statistical Life (VSL).9 Specifically, VSL is a concept from normative economics—
how much consumption should governments be willing to trade-off for an increase in the 
number of lives saved. This is a question which can be answered through stated-preference 
methods as has been done elsewhere (e.g. Alberini 2005; Carthy et  al. 1999; Jones-Lee 
1974). Rather, the implied price of life we calculate can be seen as an answer to the posi-
tive economics question of how governments actually do price lives saved in terms of con-
sumption lost when making policy decisions.
3.1  Calculating the Implied Price of Life
The key insight is that as the pandemic progressed governments continually had to decide 
when the moment was right to introduce a lockdown. Earlier lockdowns would save more 
lives, but likely impose greater immediate costs upon the economy. Likewise, delaying 
lockdown also delays the point at which a government becomes either morally or legally 
responsible for addressing the costs which such restrictions impose upon business. There-
fore, ex-ante the expectation was that earlier lockdown meant greater financial cost. Ex-
post, it seems governments may have been somewhat wrong to make that assumption 
as longer-term earlier lockdowns actually appear to be associated with shorter overall 
9 The distinction between price and value in the context of life is much the same as that in the diamond-
water paradox highlighted by Adam Smith (1776).
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lockdown length, as is clear in Online Appendix 4, which in turn result in lower long-term 
economic costs (Balmford et al. 2020). Nonetheless, early imposition of lockdown imposed 
the certainty of cost, while a delay held out the possibility that the epidemic may turn out 
to be less severe than expected. Gambler governments chose to delay rather than act.
The chosen date of lockdown reveals a government’s preferences regarding the trade-off 
between avoided deaths and GDP losses.10 Relative to the chosen lockdown date, a later 
lockdown would have cost more lives, but reduced the financial impact. In its choice of 
lockdown date a government implicitly accepted the associated GDP loss rather than bear 
a greater death toll. Earlier lockdowns would have had the reverse effect; saving more lives 
but at a greater cost to the economy. In choosing not to enter lockdown earlier, the gov-
ernment rejected the higher financial cost of earlier lockdown in favour of more deaths. 
Hence, we are able to calculate both accepted and rejected prices for human lives: upper 
and lower bounds for the implied price of life in each country.11
A criticism of this method may be that decision makers at the time were unaware of the 
benefits of lockdown for public health. The evidence, however, points to the contrary. For 
example, it was reported in the print media at least as early as 7th March that the lockdown 
in Wuhan was showing signs of slowing the spread of coronavirus (Qin 2020). Within the 
UK there is evidence that scientific advisors notified the UK government of the benefits of 
lockdown two weeks prior to its imposition (Barlow 2020).12
Calculations of the implied price of life for each country require two data points. First, 
the differential effect on human lives lost from a marginal change in lockdown date. Sec-
ond, the marginal effect on GDP from the same change in lockdown date.
3.2  Modelling Deaths Across for Different Lockdown Dates
We use a compartmental epidemiological model to simulate the epidemic in each country 
and in particular to predict the outcomes of the counterfactual scenarios in which lock-
down dates are changed. In this type of model, at any moment in time the population of a 
region or country is distributed between compartments according to disease status, and the 
function of the model is to describe (and predict) how the population flows between these 
10 That such a trade-off is inevitable and in principal morally defensible is not questioned, indeed it follows 
logically from the VSL. Increasing economic costs impact upon human welfare. An approach which says 
that every life is of infinite value would impose infinite costs upon the economy, resulting in far greater 
losses of human wellbeing (and almost certainly life) than acting in a way which imposes an implicit and 
non-infinite price on life. It is the cross-country comparison of that implicit price which is examined here.
11 Our focus on GDP reflects both the ubiquity of this measure and a lack of available, robust, economic 
estimates of the wider welfare impacts of lockdown. To better understand some of those wider costs, we 
direct the interested reader to: Branley-Bell and Talbot, 2020; Burki, 2020; Cash and Patel, 2020; Chaix 
et al., 2020; McLay, 2020; Pancani et al., 2020; Pinto and Jones, 2020; Sud et al., 2020; Van Lancker and 
Parolin, 2020. While driven out of necessity, we think that a focus solely on GDP is also justified. Our inter-
est is in the relative price of life across country. Even accounting for the external costs, the relative pattern 
for price of life would remain; it could only be eroded if these external costs are disproportionately larger 
for countries with lower GDP-based price-of-life estimates.
12 Indeed Grant Shapps, a UK Government minister, was questioned on 16th March 2020, a full week 
before the UK entered lockdown, regarding why the UK was following the example of other countries in 
implementing a lockdown given evidence that such a response seemed to work. A summary of the inter-
view is available on the Sky website here: https ://news.sky.com/video /coron aviru s-uk-appro ach-entir ely-
scien ce-led-grant -shapp s-11958 199. There is also a video of the interview on the Sky Facebook channel 
here: https ://www.faceb ook.com/watch /?v=23018 17381 09777 .
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compartments as the epidemic progresses. In the SEIR model which we are using, there 
are four compartments corresponding to Susceptible (i.e., not infected, but vulnerable to 
the disease), Exposed (a latent stage usually lasting a few days, where the victim has been 
infected but is not yet infectious), Infectious (at which point they can pass the disease on 
to others), and Removed (meaning they are no longer infectious and may be either recov-
ered from the disease and immune, or else dead). In more complex models, the population 
may also be subdivided according to age and other factors, with each subdivision being 
compartmentalised according to disease status as previously described. This would allow 
for a more detailed representation of the structure of society and the progress of the epi-
demic as it spreads through the population, but such detail would greatly increase compu-
tational demands (especially for large ensembles of simulations as we are using here) and 
is not necessary for this work. For a full description of the model we are using, see Annan 
and Hargreaves (2020) and also House (2020) where the underlying model equations were 
originally presented. The flow of the population between the compartments depends on 
parameters which we estimate by fitting the model to observational data for each coun-
try. This model fitting process follows the standard Bayesian paradigm of defining prior 
distributions for uncertain parameters, running the model numerous times with parame-
ters sampled from these priors, and calculating the likelihood on the basis of how well the 
model outputs match the specific observational data that we are using. This process (using 
a Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach) is described in detail in Annan and Hargreaves 
(2020). This approach requires around 15,000 model simulations for each experiment (i.e. 
country) and the results are represented by an ensemble of model simulations that samples 
our posterior probability distribution.
One critical parameter of the model, which has been widely discussed in the literature 
and media, is the reproductive number or R, which is the number of new cases that each 
infectious case generates in a fully susceptible population. If R is greater than 1, the epi-
demic initially exhibits exponential growth until it infects a sufficiently high proportion of 
the population that the remaining susceptible fraction substantially shrinks. If R is less than 
1, the epidemic decays, again exponentially. In our estimation procedure, we assume that 
all uncertain model parameters are fixed in time apart from R, which is treated as piecewise 
constant. We consider three discrete periods within which R is constant. First, there is an 
initial period prior to “lockdown” controls being imposed by governments. A new, lower 
value for R is then assumed to apply during the period of strict controls, with a third value 
applying after the controls are significantly relaxed. Country specific lockdown dates that 
we use are detailed in Online Appendix 4. In reality, R and other model parameters are 
likely to vary somewhat during these periods but this piecewise constant approach has been 
widely used and captures the dominant features of the system (e.g. Flaxman et al. 2020).13
Due to serious limitations in the testing and reporting of case numbers, we rely exclu-
sively on daily reported death numbers for the calibration of our model. Again, this is a 
common approach which is justified on the basis that the reporting of deaths is usually far 
more consistent and reliable than case numbers which depend strongly on testing capacity 
and policy. An alternative approach would be to use the number of excess death. While 
this may better reflect the number of deaths caused by Covid than reported death statistics, 
13 Note that any changes in R between time periods captures changes due both to lockdown itself, and any 
other policy changes to the extent they co-occur with changes in lockdown legislation. That said, Flaxman 
et al (2020) make clearly show that the vast majority of policy impact on R is driven by the decision to 
enter lockdown.
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daily excess death data are not available. Moreover, the key results in the model are driven 
by changes in the rate of infection, hence even if death numbers in a particular country are 
underestimated due to systematic biases, this will not usually bias the estimates of model 
parameters. Therefore to calibrate the models we use daily reported deaths from Our World 
in Data up to 9th June (Beltekian et al. 2020), and later suggest how accounting for excess 
mortality would alter our estimates.
The prior estimate for R after the release of lockdown is taken to be N(1,0.22) which 
represents our assumption that the policies are intended to be as open as possible while 
keeping the epidemic controlled. In many cases, there are insufficient data to constrain this 
prior estimate strongly, and therefore it plays a greater role in our results than the priors 
used in earlier phases of the epidemic. Estimates of all the R values, as well as our priors, 
are detailed in Online Appendix 5. Lockdown clearly reduces the infection rate across the 
board. Easing lockdown allows the infection rates to increase again.
Figure  2 compares observed and modelled deaths in the UK, showing deaths on the 
(exponential) vertical axis over time. Modelled mortality (the solid line) closely matches 
the actually observed deaths (circles), illustrating that the modelling framework is flexible 
enough and the methodology sufficiently rigorous that the epidemiological model well rep-
licates the observed patterns in the UK. Indeed, only on 3  days do observed deaths fall 
outside the 95% confidence interval (shaded area), and all such occurrences are in the post-
lockdown period when the number of daily deaths is comparatively low. Similarly, close 
relationships are displayed for the other countries in the equivalent plots (Online Appen-
dix 6), highlighting that the model well captures the country specific pandemic pathways.
In order to calculate the effects of changing the dates of lockdown, we use the fit-
ted parameter values, and perform simulations in which the date of imposing lockdown 
is changed—either delayed or advanced by 3 days. We also explore advancing or delay-
ing lockdown by 7 or 12 days, results of which are presented in Online Appendix 7. This 
approach is similar to that of others (e.g. Flaxman et al. 2020) in which the effects of poli-
cies have been analysed. Since we are using a single date to represent the net effect of 
multiple policies which were introduced across a period of several days, it would be more 
precise to interpret these scenarios as representing a change in the timing of all such poli-
cies by the given number of days. Likewise, we identify the impact of lockdown using 
within-country variation in the rate of infection. Therefore, to the extent that the stringency 
of policy interventions vary between countries, our simulations reflect the same country-
specific set of policy interventions of the same stringency being implemented either ear-
lier or later. That said, the lockdown is widely believed to be the most important of these 
measures (Flaxman et al. 2020) and so we consider our interpretation to be a reasonable 
approximation of the impacts of lockdown and variation therein. Differences in total mor-
tality for each country dependent on date of lockdown are calculated to 24th June 2020. 
We also calculate the number of deaths that likely would have occurred were no lockdown 
implemented, again to the 24th June 2020. For illustrative purposes, the graph of predicted 
daily deaths for the UK under such a scenario is in Online Appendix 8.14 In all cases, no 
correction is made for the possibility that hospitals got overwhelmed, causing an increase 
in infection-fatality ratios. To the extent that such an outcome would have occurred, yet 
more lives would have been lost under the delayed- and no-lockdown scenarios.
14 The graphs are similar for all other countries, and hence not displayed here.
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3.3  The Impact of Lockdown Decisions on Lives Lost
Table 3 highlights the likely impacts of lockdown policy. It is clear that the imposition of 
lockdown likely saved in excess of 14 million lives across the countries we examine. This 
overall analysis of lockdown is similar to that of Flaxman et al. (2020) and comparison of 
overlapping results shows that they are in most cases strikingly similar.15 However, we cau-
tion against over-interpreting the result: it is likely that even without a formal lockdown, 
people would have socially distanced and engaged in other behaviours to limit Covid-
19 deaths. Nevertheless, earlier governmental action would have saved a large numbers 
of lives, particularly in countries such as the UK and US who acted relatively late. Pre-
lockdown reproduction rates are substantially greater than one, hence across all countries, 
longer delays result in exponentially greater losses of life.
3.4  Economic and Financial Consequences of Lockdown
The previous sub-section presented clear evidence that the choice of when to impose lock-
down drastically affects the likely number of deaths. Moreover, there is significant hetero-
geneity across countries in the number of lives that would have been saved had lockdown 
been implemented just 3 days earlier or later. How does this heterogeneity translate into the 
implied price of life across countries?
To assess the price of life we require estimates of the financial cost of lockdown on 
GDP. We first assume that the full cost of any extension to the length of lockdown is felt 
in the year 2020. Therefore, we estimates the cost to GDP by comparing the last IMF fore-
casts of national GDP in 2020 prior to the pandemic (from October 2019; IMF 2019) with 
their most recent forecast for 2020 (April 2020, IMF 2020b).16
Further assumptions are needed to understand the cost of a marginal extension to lock-
down. The first is the relationship between lockdown length and cost to GDP. In line with 
the best available evidence, from studies in the US (Walmsley et al. 2020) and thirty pan-
global countries (with a focus on European nations, Fernandes 2020), length of lockdown 
appears to be directly proportional to the percentage GDP loss. Of course, not all of the 
GDP loss associated with an extended lockdown is the result of the policy decision alone: 
progression of the pandemic sufficient to warrant a lockdown (extension) would reduce 
GDP outlook anyway and there is good evidence that people were changing their behav-
iours to enact social distancing in advance of direct regulations (Gupta et al. 2020). Moreo-
ver, it is not just the domestic pandemic which causes GDP losses—some is also driven by 
the state of the virus in other nations owing to trade (Mandel and Veetil 2020). Hence we 
must also make an assumption about how much of the loss in GDP in any given country 
is the result of the lockdown policy, rather than other factors associated with the ongo-
ing pandemic. Andersen et  al. (2020), Chronopoulos et  al. (2020) and Goldsztejn et  al. 
(2020) have all teased apart the effects of lockdown policy from the wider pandemic. All 
three suggest that the GDP loss caused by lockdown policy is approximately 15% of the 
15 Note however that our estimates for lives saved in Belgium and Italy are somewhat more conservative 
than those of Flaxman et al (2020), owing to our slightly lower infection-fatality ratio.
16 IMF forecasts for GDP are in line with those provided by other experts. For example, recent IMF pre-
dictions for the UK represents the median from a range of other forecasters (Resolution Foundation 2020 
as cited in Richiardi et al. 2020). Note that we assume that the IMF’s April 2020 GDP forecast reflects an 
accurate expectation of the length of lockdown imposed in each country.
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total GDP loss experienced by each country.17 We note of course that there are reasons to 
believe this figure could be an over- or under-estimate of the proportion of cost attributable 
to the lockdown policy, and that this could also vary somewhat by country given that lock-
down policy may have different impacts on different industries.18 Nonetheless, we see the 
0.15 estimate as offering a reasonable ball-park figure, and so adjust predicted GDP losses 
as per Eq. 2:
Equation 2 states that the GDP loss caused by changing the length of lockdown by some 
amount (either 3, 7 or 12 days; denoted i ), in country j , is calculated as the relative change 






× IMF forecast GDP lossj × 0.15
Fig. 2  Observed and modelled deaths in the UK. Notes: The progression of the pandemic is divided into 
three time frames for each country: pre-lockdown (for the UK, before 23rd March), during lockdown (23rd 
March–11th May), and post lockdown (after 11th May). These time frames matter because the infection rate 
(R) changes as a result of imposing and subsequently easing lockdown. The posterior estimates for each 
period, and the 95% CIs are displayed on the graph
17 Andersen et  al use data from individual-level transaction data either side of the border between Den-
mark, which imposed a lockdown, and Sweden, which did not. Denmark saw transactions reduce 29% in 
the immediate aftermath of lockdown imposition compared to Sweden’s 25% reduction. This suggests that 
13.8% of the GDP loss Denmark experienced is caused by the lockdown rather than mere pandemic pro-
gression. Chronopolous et al present evidence from either side of the UK lockdown, again using individual-
consumer-level transaction data. This suggests a similar proportion of the overall cost is attributable to the 
lockdown policy: spending drops by 15.2% in the week following lockdown (week beginning 23rd March 
2020) relative to the previous period. Goldsztejn et al conduct a modelling exercise linking economic data 
to an SEIR model for the UK again. This suggests that lockdown accounts for 17% of the overall economic 
downturn.
18 As more accurate estimates of this key parameter become available, we would encourage the interested 
reader to replicate our calculations but with an updated estimate of the proportion of GDP loss attributable 
to lockdown policy to provide more accurate estimates of the price of life.
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the proportion of the loss attributable to the policy decision ( 0.15 ). We adopt the IMF met-
ric for measuring GDP in terms of Purchasing Power Parity International dollars (PPP$) 
which is held constant such that it is equal to the US dollar. For Hubei, we use the same 
formula as above, however the IMF only publishes estimates GDP forecasts at the national 
level. Therefore we partition the effect for Hubei alone by multiplying by the proportion of 
China’s GDP which Hubei makes up (0.04,651).19 The necessary data, and calculated GDP 
outcomes, are presented in Online Appendix 8.
It is worth highlighting two further implicit assumptions. First, we assume all of the 
GDP loss a country experiences occurs during the lockdown period. Clearly, countries’ 
economies were already contracting pre-lockdown, and likely will take a long time to 
return to normal functioning post-easement. However, our assumption ensures that the 
implied price of life we calculate is an upper bound. Second, we assume that the date on 
which lockdown is eased is independent of the date on which lockdown was imposed. 
This is an open empirical question as it may be that earlier lockdowns halt the spread of 
the virus quicker, allowing an earlier end to lockdown. If earlier lockdowns result in ear-
lier release this would lower the overall financial burden of lockdown. Hence, again our 
assumption tends towards an upper bound estimate on the price of life. The additional 
assumption made for Hubei may underestimate the price of life there: the contraction in 
China’s GDP is likely most keenly felt in Hubei, the worst hit province. Our estimates of 
price of life would increase if we adjusted for this.
Aside from the caveat with respect to China, while our assumptions influence absolute 
estimates of the price of life, the only variables affecting the relative prices across coun-
tries are: (1) the number of lives a change in the length of lockdown would save; (2) the 
original length of lockdown in a country; and (3) a country’s GDP. These key variables are 
not assumed. To underscore the point, our assumptions cannot substantially influence the 
implied relative price of life across countries.
3.5  Cross‑Country Estimates of the Price of Life
To calculate the implied price of life from a change in the length of lockdown of a set num-
ber of days, i , for country, j , we link the predicted change in GDP to the change in number 
of lives lost as in Eq. 3:
Our primary focus is for the most marginal change in length of lockdown we calculate: 
imposing lockdown either 3  days earlier or later than its actual date. Results for differ-
ent changes in lockdown date, of 7 and 12 days, are presented in Appendices 9 and 10. 
These show that relative patterns remain unchanged. Table 3 showed that the exponential 
growth in infections means more lives are lost from a delay, than would be saved by shift-
ing lockdown earlier by the same number of days. In contrast the modelled impact on GDP 
from moving the lockdown date by a fixed number of days is exactly the same; the only 
difference is in the sign (earlier lockdowns are a cost to GDP, later lockdowns a benefit). 
Hence, the implied price of life is higher for moving lockdown earlier as opposed to later. 
(3)Implied price of lifeij = ΔGDPij∕ΔLives lostij
19 This is calculated from estimates of 2019 provincial GDP published by the National Bureau of Statistics 
China, downloadable here: http://data.stats .gov.cn/engli sh/easyq uery.htm?cn=E0103 [Accessed 12th June 
2020].
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Moreover, as explained previously, by choosing not to impose lockdowns 3  days earlier 
governments rejected saving more lives when the price was relatively high. Similar logic 
reveals them to have accepted the implied price of life from a delay; they would rather bear 
the cost in terms of GDP than as further human lives lost. Results from these analysis are 
presented in Table 4.
Obviously, estimates for prices countries were willing to pay (accepted) are lower than 
estimates for the prices countries rejected. In almost all cases the estimates of the price 
of life are below thresholds typically used to estimate the VSL in cost–benefit analyses. 
Hence, ex-post, it is highly likely lockdown enhance social welfare.20 As with progression 
of the pandemic, there is huge heterogeneity in the price of life across countries. Compar-
ing across countries those who pursued an early lockdown strategy reveal they are willing 
to pay a high price to save their citizen’s lives, only rejecting prices above $1,000,000. The 
highest implied prices are in Korea (> $11,000,000) and New Zealand (> $6,000,000), both 
countries who acted swiftly to suppress the pandemic.21 However, those countries which 
imposed lockdown relatively late-on in their respective pandemics were clearly only will-
ing to pay far less to protect lives. Belgium, Italy and the UK reject prices of life around 
$100,000.
Clearly, delayed action in the face of exponential growth cost lives, and implied low 
price of life in those countries imposed lockdowns relatively late in the pandemic. Two 
comparisons make this cross-country variation in the implied price of life particularly 
clear. First, the accepted price of life in China ($108,000) is about 25% higher than that 
for an American ($87,000). This is despite our methods meaning the calculated price of 
life for China is likely an underestimate.22 Second, compare the acceptable price of life 
in Germany ($525,000) with that in the UK ($67,000). The price of life for a German is 
nearly an order of magnitude greater than that for a British citizen. That vast difference 
is despite the two countries being very similar in terms of GDP per capita. These relative 
implied price of life comparisons are particularly pertinent. Our methodology uses ex-post 
estimates of the number of lives saved to infer what government policy implies for the 
price of life. Yet, these governments were clearly making the decisions ex-ante. Nonethe-
less, these governments were making lockdown decisions at around the same time (except 
Hubei which was far earlier), with nearly identical information sets. Thus any differences 
in relative estimates would hold true even if the pandemic had proved to be far less deadly 
than it actually is.
Moreover, this heterogeneity in the price of life is not explained by different values for 
life. Indeed, the implied prices are often far lower than official VSL estimates—seemingly, 
cash flowing through the market is worth much more than value passing through wellbe-
ing, at least to some countries. The low rejected prices also imply that very few Quality 
20 Ideally we would assess all of the consequences of interventions (e.g. the mental health costs of lock-
down) before making such an assertion. However, the difference between VSL values and our price of life 
estimates suggest that our statement is defensible (certainly for those countries where the latter measures 
are particularly low).
21 Moreover, Vietnam would have been included in the modelling exercise, but we were unable to robustly 
parameterise our epidemiological models as so few cases (let alone deaths, of which there have been none) 
have occurred.
22 This is true to the extent to which officially reported Covid-19 deaths in China are accurate. If officially 
reported deaths are far lower than the number of deaths which have actually occurred, this figure may well 
be an overestimate of the price of life in China. We have not found data from China on excess mortality and 
so cannot speculate on the degree to which mortality data are accurate.
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Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) are assumed to be saved by governments in reducing Covid-
19-related mortality; otherwise delays to lockdown seem nonsensical. For reference, in 
the UK the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence views a QALY costing 
between £20,000 and £30,000 as good value (NICE 2012).
As we mentioned when discussing Table 2, those countries with high reported Covid 
deaths, tend to be countries with high ratios of excess mortality to reported death, i.e. there 
is substantial under-reporting. To examine the extent to which our estimates change when 
we account for this under-reporting, we focus on the set of countries for which we have 
reliable estimates of that ratio, and where under-reporting appears prevalent. These coun-
tries are: Italy, the UK and the USA. The estimates reported in Table 5 are calculated by 
dividing the estimates of the price of life by the ratio of excess mortality to reported deaths 
(from Table 2). The intuition behind this is that our estimates of lives saved by lockdowns 
(used in Table 4) are based upon reported death data, and hence should be scaled upwards 
by the degree of under-reporting of deaths. Implicit in this correction is the assumption 
that the ratio of excess death to reported death is constant within a country throughout the 
pandemic. It is possible that the ratio declines during the tail of the pandemic when Covid 
cases and deaths are less common, and tests more available. Nonetheless, our correction 
offers what is currently the most comparable cross-country figure.
Table  5 shows that for those countries which under-report Covid-19 deaths, implied 
price of life is substantially reduced, highlighting once again that earlier lockdowns would 
have increased social welfare tremendously. For example, in the UK, the country for which 
Table 4  Implied price of life in 
different countries (PPP$)
These results use changes in lives lost and financial estimates associ-
ated with a 3 day perturbation in the lockdown date. Accepted price of 
life calculated as the trade-off between GDP and life imagining lock-
down had been imposed 3 days later; rejected price of life as if lock-
down had been imposed 3 days earlier. Prices to the nearest thousand
Country Accepted price of life 
Mean
[95% CIs]
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we estimate a relatively high rate of under-reporting of Covid-19 deaths, the adjusted 
rejected price of life is just $65,000 (equivalent to just over £50,000). The accepted price of 
life is lower still, at $40,000 (£32,000).
4  Concluding Remarks
This study has begun to disentangle the extent to which cross-country comparisons of 
responses to Covid-19 are valid despite difficulties caused by both exogenous factors and 
differences in testing rates and the recording of cases and deaths. The results presented in 
this paper suggest that policy interventions may well explain the majority of cross-country 
variation in officially reported Covid-19 deaths.
For some countries, deficiencies in official approaches to the recording of Covid-19 mor-
tality mean that estimates based upon deviation of overall deaths away from the seasonally 
expected norm may provide a more accurate depiction of fatalities caused by the pandemic. 
Such ‘excess death’ estimates suggest that in some, highly impacted, countries the actual 
number of Covid-19 deaths may considerably higher than indicated in official statistics. For 
example, within the UK it seems that more than a third of Covid-19 deaths may have gone 
unrecorded. Where under-recording is prevalent, then the number of lives lost by delayed 
intervention (as well as those saved relative to even further delay) is likely to be substan-
tially higher than estimated in this paper. Any such under (over) estimation of true deaths 
would result in an over (under) estimation of the price of life implicit in lockdown decisions.
Careful consideration of cross-country differences is required if we are to glean the 
important natural experiment evidence afforded by countries implementing different pol-
icy approaches to the pandemic. The results presented in this paper highlight that well-
designed policy can save life. While the economic burden of lockdown is large, compari-
son with prior decision criteria suggest that such policies generate net benefits for society.
Acknowledgements The Authors are responsible for all views expressed in this paper, and any errors which 
may remain. That said, we are extremely grateful to a number of people and institutions for making this 
research possible. Joseph Billingsley contributed enormously to us being able to successfully gather excess 
death data for a number of countries. Discussions with Andrew Balmford significantly improved the analy-
ses we conducted. As sources of crucial data, and for their commitment to facilitating open science, we are 
extremely grateful to: Our World in Data, The Oxford Government Response Tracker, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity’s Coronavirus Resource Center, The Economist (and particularly James Tozer and Martín González), 
and The Financial Times.
Table 5  Implied price of life 
in different countries after 
correcting for under-reporting 
(PPP$)
As described in text, these figures are calculated by dividing the price 
of life estimates in Table 4 by the country-specific estimate of under-
reporting (ratio of excess death to reported Covid death) in Table 2. 
Prices to the nearest thousand
Country Accepted price of life 
Mean
[95% CIs]
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